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Abstract
The development of quantum information theory has renewed in-
terest in the idea that the state vector does not represent the state of
a quantum system, but rather the knowledge or information that we
may have on the system. I argue that this epistemic view of states
appears to solve foundational problems of quantum mechanics only at
the price of being essentially incomplete.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The foundations and the interpretation of quantum mechanics, much dis-
cussed by the founders of the theory, have blossomed anew in the past few
decades. It has been pointed out that every single year between 1972 and
2001 has witnessed at least one scientific meeting devoted to these issues [1].
Two problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics stand out promi-
nently. The first one concerns the relationship between quantum mechanics
and general relativity. Both theories are highly successful empirically, but
they appear to be mutually inconsistent. Most investigators used to believe
that the problem lies more with general relativity than with quantum me-
chanics, and that the solution would consist in coming up with a suitable
quantum version of Einstein’s gravitational theory. More recently, however,
it has become likely that a correct quantum theory of gravity may involve
leaps substantially bolder [2].
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The second problem is more down-to-earth, and shows up starkly in or-
dinary nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. It consists in the reconciliation
of the apparently indeterminate nature of quantum observables with the ap-
parently determinate nature of classical observables, and it crystallizes in
the so-called measurement problem. Broadly speaking, there are two ways
to address it. The first one, elaborated by von Neumann [3], consists in
denying the universal validity of the unitary evolution of quantum states,
governed by the Schro¨dinger equation. State vector collapse, postulated by
von Neumann but not worked out in detail by him, was made much more
precise recently in spontaneous localization models [4]. The second road to
reconciliation consists in stressing the universal validity of the Schro¨dinger
equation, while assigning values to specific observables of which the state vec-
tor is not necessarily an eigenstate. Bohmian mechanics [5, 6, 7] and modal
interpretations [8, 9], among others, fall in this category.
The past twenty years have also witnessed the inception and quick devel-
opment of quantum information theory. This was not unrelated to founda-
tional studies. Quantum cryptography [10] and quantum teleportation [11],
for instance, are based on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen setup and algorithms
for fast computation use entanglement in an essential way [12].
As foundational studies contributed to quantum information theory, a
number of investigators feel that quantum information theory has much to
contribute to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. This has to do with
what has been called the epistemic view of state vectors, which goes back at
least to Heisenberg [13] but has significantly evolved in the past few years [1,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. In the epistemic view, the state vector (or wave function,
or density matrix) does not represent the objective state of a microscopic
system (like an atom, an electron, a photon), but rather our knowledge of
the probabilities of outcomes of macroscopic measurements. This, so the
argument goes, considerably clarifies, or even completely dissolves, the EPR
paradox and the measurement problem.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of the epistemic view.
It is a minimal interpretation, and indeed was referred to as an “interpre-
tation without interpretation” [16]. The question of the adequacy of the
epistemic view is much the same as the one whether quantum mechanics
needs being interpreted.
In Sec. 2, I shall review the main arguments in favor of the epistemic
view of quantum states. They have to do with state vector collapse and
the consistency of quantum mechanics with special relativity. It turns out
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that the issue of interpretation can fruitfully be analyzed in the context of
the semantic view of theories. As outlined in Sec. 3, this approach tries to
answer the question, How can the world be the way the theory says it is?
The next section will describe a world where the epistemic view would be
adequate. This, it turns out, is not the world we live in, and Secs. 5 and 6
will argue that in the real world, the epistemic view in fact begs the question
of interpretation.
2 ARGUMENTS FOR THE EPISTEMIC
VIEW
Interpretations of quantum mechanics can be asserted with various de-
grees of illocutionary strength. The many-worlds interpretation [19], for in-
stance, has sometimes been presented as following directly from the quantum-
mechanical formalism. In a similar vein, Rovelli has proposed that the epis-
temic view follows from the observation that different observers may give
different accounts of the same sequence of events [15].
Rovelli’s argument goes as follows. A quantum system S with two-
dimensional state space is initially described by the state vector |ψ〉 =
α|1〉 + β|2〉, where |1〉 and |2〉 are orthonormal eigenvectors of an observ-
able Q. Sometime between ti and tf , an apparatus O (which may or may not
include a human being) performs a measurement of Q on S, obtaining the
value 1. Call this experiment E . According to standard quantum mechanics,
O describes E as
ti −→ tf
α|1〉+ β|2〉 −→ |1〉. (1)
Now let a second observer P describe the compound system made up of S
and O. Let |Oi〉 be the state vector of O at ti. The measurement interaction
between O and S implies that their total state vector becomes entangled.
Thus from the point of view of P , who performs no measurement between ti
and tf , the experiment E should be described as
ti −→ tf
(α|1〉+ β|2〉)⊗ |Oi〉 −→ α|1〉 ⊗ |O1〉+ β|2〉 ⊗ |O2〉. (2)
Here |O1〉 and |O2〉 are pointer states of O showing results 1 and 2.
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According to Rovelli, Eq. (1) is the conventional quantum-mechanical
description of experiment E from the point of view of O, whereas Eq. (2) is
the description of E from the point of view of P . From this he concludes that
“[i]n quantum mechanics different observers may give different accounts of
the same sequence of events.” Or, to borrow the title of his Sec. 2, “Quantum
mechanics is a theory about information.”
To someone who believes there is a state of affairs of some sort behind
the description, the difference between O’s and P’s point of view means
that one of them is mistaken. To put it differently, the problem with the
argument is that expressions like “standard quantum mechanics” or “con-
ventional quantum-mechanical description” are ambiguous. They can refer
either (i) to strict unitary Schro¨dinger evolution, or (ii) in the manner of von
Neumann, to Schro¨dinger evolution and collapse. Once a precise definition
is agreed upon, either description (1) or description (2) (but not both) is
correct. Strict Schro¨dinger evolution (i) is encapsulated in Eq. (2), whereas
Schro¨dinger evolution with collapse (ii) is encapsulated in Eq. (1). As one
may see it, the issue is not that the description depends on the observer, but
that with any precise definition there is a specific problem. With definition
(i), quantum mechanics seems to contradict experiment, while with defini-
tion (ii), one needs to provide an explicit collapse mechanism. Thus Rovelli’s
discussion, rather than establishing the epistemic view, brings us back to the
foundational problem outlined in Sec. 1.1
The epistemic view can also be propounded not as a consequence of the
quantum-mechanical formalism, but as a way to solve the foundational prob-
lems. It does so by denying that the (in this context utterly misnamed) state
vector represents the state of a microscopic system. Rather, the state vec-
tor represents knowledge about the probabilities of results of measurements
performed in a given context with a macroscopic apparatus, that is, infor-
mation about “the potential consequences of our experimental interventions
into nature” [1].
How does the epistemic view deal with the measurement problem? It does
so by construing the collapse of the state vector not as a physical process,
but as a change of knowledge [14]. Insofar as the state vector is interpreted
1In private exchanges, Rovelli stressed that the relational character of quantum theory
is the solution of the apparent contradiction between discarding Schro¨dinger evolution
without collapse and not providing an explicit collapse mechanism. My criticism of its
starting point notwithstanding, much of the discussion in Ref. [15] is lucid and thought-
provoking.
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as objectively describing the state of a physical system, its abrupt change
in a measurement implies a similar change in the system, which calls for
explanation. If, on the other hand, the state vector describes knowledge
of conditional probabilities (i.e. probabilities of future macroscopic events
conditional on past macroscopic events), then as long as what is condition-
alized upon remains the same, the state vector evolves unitarily. It collapses
when the knowledge base changes, thereby simply reflecting the change in
the conditions being held fixed in the specification of probabilities.
The epistemic view also helps in removing the clash between collapse and
Lorentz invariance [1, 20]. Take for instance the EPR setup with two spin
1/2 particles, and let the state vector |χ〉 of the compound system be an
eigenstate of the total spin operator with eigenvalue zero. One can write
|χ〉 = 1√
2
{|+;n〉 ⊗ |−;n〉 − |−;n〉 ⊗ |+;n〉} , (3)
where the first vector in a tensor product refers to particle A and the second
vector to particle B. The vector |+;n〉, for instance, stands for an eigenvector
of the n-component of the particle’s spin operator, with eigenvalue +1 (in
units of h¯/2). The unit vector n can point in any direction, a freedom which
corresponds to the rotational symmetry of |χ〉.
Suppose Alice measures the n-component of A’s spin and obtains the
value +1. If the state vector represents the objective state of a quantum
system and if collapse is a physical mechanism, then B’s state immediately
collapses to |−;n〉. This explains why Bob’s subsequent measurement of
the n-component of B’s spin yields the value −1 with certainty. Thus Al-
ice’s choice of axis at once determines the possible states into which B may
collapse, and Alice’s result immediately singles out one of these states.
If the two measurements are spacelike separated, there exist Lorentz
frames where Bob’s measurement is earlier than Alice’s. In these frames
the instantaneous collapse is triggered by Bob’s measurement. This ambi-
guity, together with the fact that what is instantaneous in one frame is not
in others, underscores the difficulty of reconciling relativistic covariance with
physical collapse.
In the epistemic view, what changes when Alice performs a measurement
is Alice’s knowledge. Bob’s knowledge will change either if he himself per-
forms a measurement, or if Alice sends him the result of her measurement
by conventional means. Hence there is no physical collapse on a spacelike
hypersurface.
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To the proponents of the epistemic view, the above arguments show that
it considerably attenuates, or even completely solves, the problems associated
with quantum measurements and collapse. I will argue, however, that this
result is achieved only at the price of giving up the search for a spelled out
consistent view of nature.2
3 THE SEMANTIC VIEW OF THEORIES
Investigations on the structure of scientific theories and the way they relate to
phenomena have kept philosophers of science busy for much of the twentieth
century. In the past few decades, the semantic view has emerged as one of
the leading approaches to these problems [8, 22, 23, 24]. Among other issues
it helps clarifying, I believe it sheds considerable light on the question of the
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In the semantic view a scientific theory is a structure, defined primarily
by models rather than by axioms or a specific linguistic formulation. A
general theoretical hypothesis then asserts that a class of real systems, under
suitable conditions of abstraction and idealization, belongs to the class of
models entertained by the theory. If the theory is empirically adequate, the
real systems behave (e.g. evolve in time) in a way predictable on the basis
of the models. Yet the empirical agreement may leave considerable room on
the way the world can be for the theory to be true. This is the question of
interpretation.
This succinct characterization can best be understood by means of ex-
amples. Take classical particle mechanics. The (mathematical) structure
consists of constants mi, functions ri(t), and vector fields Fi (understood
as masses, positions, and forces), together with the system of second-order
differential equations Fi = miai. A particular model is a system of ten point
masses interacting through the 1/r2 gravitational force. A theoretical hy-
pothesis then asserts that the solar system corresponds to this model, if the
sun and nine planets are considered pointlike and all other objects neglected.
Predictions made on the basis of the model correspond rather well with re-
ality, especially if suitable correction factors are introduced in the process of
abstraction. But obviously the model can be made much more sophisticated,
taking into account for instance the shape of the sun and planets, the planets’
satellites, interplanetary matter, and so on.
2The epistemic view was criticized from a different perspective by Zeh [21].
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Now what does the theory have to say about how a world of interacting
masses is really like? It turns out that such a world can be viewed in (at
least) two empirically equivalent but conceptually very different ways. One
can assert that it is made only of small (or extended) masses that interact
by instantaneous action at a distance. Or else, one can say that the masses
produce everywhere in space a gravitational field, which then locally exerts
forces on the masses. These are two different interpretations of the theory.
Each one expresses a possible way of making the theory true (assuming em-
pirical adequacy). Whether the world is such that masses instantaneously
interact at a distance in a vacuum, or a genuine gravitational field is produced
throughout space, the theory can be held as truly realized.
A similar discussion can be made with classical electromagnetism. The
mathematical structure consists of source fields ρ and j (understood as charge
and current densities), and vector fields E and B (electric and magnetic
fields) related to the former through Maxwell’s equations. A function F
of the fields (the Lorentz force) governs the motion of charge and current
carriers. A model of the theory might be a perfectly conducting rectangular
guide with a cylindrical dielectric post, subject to an incoming TE10 wave.
Again, each specific model of interacting charges and currents can be
viewed in empirically equivalent and conceptually different ways. One can
allow only retarded fields, or both retarded and advanced fields [25]. If
one assumes the existence of a complete absorber, one can get rid of the
fields entirely, and view electrodynamics as a theory of moving charges acting
on each other at a distance (though not instantaneously). Although the
interpretation with genuine retarded fields is the one by far the more widely
accepted, the other interpretations also provide a way by which Maxwell’s
theory can be true.
Let us now turn to quantum mechanics. The mathematical structure
consists of state spaces H, state vectors |ψ〉, and density operators ρ; of
Hermitian operators A, eigenvalues |a〉, and eigenvectors a; of projectors Pa,
etc. Defining quantum mechanics as covering strict unitary evolution, state
vectors evolve according to the Schro¨dinger equation. The scope of the theory
is specified (minimally) by associating eigenvalues a to results of possible
measurements, and quantities like Tr(ρPa) to corresponding probabilities.
One kind of real system that can be modelled on the basis of the structure
is interference in a two-slit Young setup. Often the system can conveniently
be restricted to the xy plane. In a specific model the source can be repre-
sented by a plane wave moving in the x direction, and the slits can be taken
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as modulating gaussian wave packets in the y direction. These packets then
propagate according to the Schro¨dinger equation in free space and produce a
wave pattern on a screen. The absolute square of the wave amplitude is as-
sociated with the probability that a suitable detector will click, as a function
of its position on the screen.
From the semantic point of view, the question of interpretation is the fol-
lowing: How can the world be so that quantum models representing Young
setups (as well as other situations) are empirically adequate? The Copen-
hagen answer (or at least a variant of it) says that micro-objects responsible
for the fringes don’t have well-defined properties unless these are measured,
but that large scale apparatus always have well-defined properties. I share
the view of those who believe that this answer is complete only insofar as it
precisely specifies the transition scale between the quantum and the classical.
Bohm’s answer to the above question is that all particles always have precise
positions, and these positions are the ones that show up on screens [26]. The
many-worlds view is that different detector outcomes simultaneously exist in
different worlds or in different minds. I shall shortly attempt to assess the
adequacy of the epistemic view, but first we should look at a world especially
tailored to such an interpretation.
4 A WORLD FOR THE EPISTEMIC VIEW
Consider a hypothetical world where large scale objects (meaning objects
much larger than atomic sizes) behave, for all practical purposes, like large
scale objects in the real world. The trajectories of javelins and footballs can
be computed accurately by means of classical mechanics with the use of a
uniform downward force and air resistance. Waveguides and voltmeters obey
Maxwell’s equations. Steam engines and air conditioners work according to
the laws of classical thermodynamics. The motion of planets is well described
by Newton’s laws of gravitation and of motion, slightly corrected by the
equations of general relativity.
Close to atomic scales, however, these laws may no longer hold. Except
for one restriction soon to be spelled out, I shall not be specific about the
changes that macroscopic laws may or may not undergo in the microscopic
realm. Matter, for instance, could either be continuous down to the smallest
scales, or made of a small number of constituent particles like our atoms. The
laws of particles and fields could be the same at all scales, or else they could
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undergo significant changes as we probed smaller and smaller distances.
In the hypothetical world one can perform experiments with pieces of
equipment like Young’s two-slit setup and Stern-Gerlach devices. The Young
type experiment, for instance, uses two macroscopic devices E and D that
both have on and off states and work in the following way. Whenever D is
suitably oriented with respect to E (say, roughly along the x axis) and both
are in the on state, D clicks in a more or less random way. The average time
interval between clicks depends on the distance r between D and E, and falls
roughly as 1/r2. The clicking stops if a shield of a suitable material is placed
perpendicularly to the x axis, between D and E.
If holes are pierced through the shield, however, the clicking resumes. In
particular, with two small holes of appropriate size and separation, differ-
ences in the clicking rate are observed for small transverse displacements of
D behind the shield. A plot of the clicking rate against D’s transverse coor-
dinate displays maxima and minima just as in a wave interference pattern.
No such maxima and minima are observed, however, if just one hole is open
or if both holes are open alternately.
At this stage everything happens as if E emitted some kind of particles
and D detected them, and the particles behaved according to the rules of
quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, we shall nor commit ourselves to the exis-
tence or nonexistence of these particles, except on one count. Such particles,
if they exist, are not in any way related to hypothetical constituents of the
material making up D, E, or the shield, or of any macroscopic object what-
soever. Whatever the microscopic structure of macroscopic objects, it has
nothing to do with what is responsible for the correlations between D and
E.3
In the hypothetical world one can also perform experiments with Stern-
Gerlach setups. Again a macroscopic device D′ clicks more or less randomly
when suitably oriented with respect to another macroscopic device E ′, both
being in the on state. If a large magnet (producing a strongly inhomogeneous
magnetic field) is placed along the x axis between E ′ and D′, clicks are no
longer observed where D′ used to be. Rather they are observed if D′ is
moved transversally to (say) two different positions, symmetrically oriented
with respect to the x axis. Let ξ be the axis going from the first magnet to
3Any objection to the hypothetical world on grounds that energy might not be con-
served, action would not entail corresponding reaction, and so on, would miss the point,
which is to clarify in what context the epistemic view can be held appropriately.
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one of these positions. If a second magnet is put behind the first one along
the ξ axis and D′ is placed further behind, then D′ clicks in two different
positions in the plane perpendicular to ξ. In the hypothetical world the
average clicking rate depends on the magnet’s orientation, and it follows
the quantum-mechanical rules of spin 1/2 particles. Once again, however,
we assume that the phenomenon responsible for the correlations between
D′ and E ′ has nothing to do with hypothetical constituents of macroscopic
objects.
In the two experiments just described, quantum mechanics correctly pre-
dicts the correlations between D and E (or D′ and E ′) when suitable macro-
scopic devices are interposed between them. In that situation, the theory
can be interpreted in (at least) two broadly different ways. In one interpre-
tation, the theory is understood as applying to genuine microscopic objects,
emitted by E and detected by D. Perhaps these objects follow Bohmian like
trajectories, or behave between emitter and detector in some other way com-
patible with quantum mechanics. In the other interpretation, there are no
microscopic objects whatsoever going from E to D. There may be something
like an action at a distance. At any rate the theory is in that case interpreted
instrumentally, for the purpose of quantitatively accounting for correlations
in the stochastic behavior of E and D.
In the hypothetical world being considered, I would maintain that both
interpretations are logically consistent and adequate. Both clearly spell out
how the world can possibly be the way the theory says it is. Of course, each
particular investigator can find more satisfaction in one interpretation than
in the other. The epistemic view corresponds here to the instrumentalist
interpretation. It simply rejects the existence of microscopic objects that
have no other use than the one of predicting observed correlations between
macroscopic objects.
5 INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EPISTEMIC
VIEW
We shall assume that macroscopic objects exist and are always in definite
states.4 Not everyone agrees with this. Idealistic thinkers believe there is
4By this assumption, I mean that they are not in quantum superpositions of macro-
scopically distinct states. They may still be subject to the very tiny uncertainties required
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nothing outside mind, and some fruitful interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics (like the many-minds interpretation) claim we are mistaken in assuming
the definiteness of macroscopic states.
For the purpose of asserting the relevance of the epistemic view, however,
these assumptions can be maintained. Indeed much of the appeal of the
epistemic view is that it appears to reconcile them with the exact validity of
quantum mechanics.
All scientists today believe that macroscopic objects are in some sense
made of atoms and molecules or, more fundamentally, of electrons, protons,
neutrons, photons, etc. The epistemic view claims that state vectors do
not represent states of microscopic objects, but knowledge of probabilities of
experimental results. I suggest that with respect to atoms, electrons, and
similar entities this can mean broadly either of three things:
1. Micro-objects do not exist [27].
2. Micro-objects may exist but they have no states.
3. Micro-objects may exist and may have states, but attempts at narrow-
ing down their existence or specifying their states are useless, confusing,
or methodologically inappropriate.
In the first case, the question that immediately comes to mind is the
following: How can something that exists (macroscopic objects) be made of
something that does not exist (micro-objects)?5 And in the second case, we
can ask similarly: How can something that has a state be made of something
that does not have one?
Can we conclude from these interrogations that the epistemic view is
logically inconsistent? Is the argument of the last paragraph a reductio ad
absurdum? Not so. What the questions really ask is the following: How is
it possible that the world be like that? How, for instance, can we have a
well-defined macroscopic state starting from objects that do not have states?
This, we have seen, is precisely the question of interpretation. Hence if the
epistemic view is asserted as in cases (1) and (2), our discussion shows that
by Heisenberg’s principle.
5I can find no answer to this question in Ref. [27] which, however, fits remarkably well
with the hypothetical world of Sec. 4.
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it is incomplete and paradoxical, and that the process of completion and
paradox resolution coincides with the one of interpretation.6
To address the third case, it will help focussing on a particular argument
along this line, the one recently put forth by Bub [18]. Having in mind
mechanical extensions of the quantum theory by means of nonclassical waves
and particles, Bub appeals to the following methodological principle:
[I]f T ′ and T ′′ are empirically equivalent extensions of a theory
T , and if T entails that, in principle, there could not be evidence
favoring one of the rival extensions T ′ or T ′′, then it is not rational
to believe either T ′ or T ′′.
Bub then contrasts the relationship between the quantum theory and its
mechanical extensions like Bohmian mechanics, with the relationship be-
tween classical thermodynamics and its mechanical explanation through the
kinetic-molecular theory. In the latter case there are empirical differences,
as Einstein showed in 1905 in the context of Brownian motion, and as Perrin
observed in 1909.
The realization that there may be empirical differences between thermo-
dynamics and the kinetic theory of gases goes back to the 1860’s [29], and is
connected with the names of Loschmidt and Maxwell. But the kinetic theory
is much older. Leaving aside the speculations of the Greek atomists, we find
atomism well alive in the writings of Boyle and Newton in the seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries. D. Bernouilli explained the pressure of a gas
in terms of atomic collisions in 1738, and Dalton used atoms to explain the
law of multiple proportions around 1808. All this time though, there was
little indication that the empirical content of the atomic models and the
phenomenological theories might be different.
One may argue whether it was rational to believe in atoms before Losch-
midt, but there is no question that it was very fruitful. As a matter of
fact, one of the reasons for contemplating empirically equivalent extensions
of theories is that they may open the way to nonequivalent theories. This
was clearly one of Bohm’s preoccupations in 1952 [5]. That this perspective
may or may not bear fruits remains to be seen.
6Although a proponent of the epistemic view, Spekkens suggests looking for “the ontic
states of which quantum states are states of knowledge” [17]. A specific way of making
sense of quantum mechanics understood as a probability algorithm was recently proposed
by Mohrhoff [28].
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In the semantic view, the empirically equivalent mechanical extensions T ′
and T ′′ of T are rather called interpretations, emphasizing that each points
to how the world can possibly be the way the theory says it is. Equivalently,
each shows a way the theory can be true. In classical physics, finding ways
that the theory can be true is usually nonproblematic, as was illustrated
in Sec. 3. This, however, is not the case with the quantum theory. Every
logically consistent interpretation proposed should therefore be viewed as
adding to the understanding of the theory.
Bub’s methodological principle states that it is not rational to believe in
empirically equivalent extensions T ′ or T ′′ of T , if there cannot in principle
be evidence favoring the extensions. Presumably, however, it is rational
to believe in T (assuming empirical adequacy). If T is singled out among
its empirical equivalents, it must be so on the basis of criteria other than
empirical, perhaps something like Ockham’s razor. This comes as no surprise
since even within the class of internally consistent theories, acceptance almost
never depends on empirical criteria alone.
What criteria, other than empirical, make for theory acceptance has been
the subject of lively debate, and the question may never be settled. But the
problem of acceptance translates to interpretations. Assume that a theory
is empirically adequate, and consider all the ways the world can be for the
theory to be so. Each of these ways is an interpretation. Let an interpretation
be true just in case the world is actually like it says it is. Necessarily then,
an empirically adequate theory has one of its interpretations that is true.
Now assume that, among all available interpretations of a theory, no one
is found acceptable on a given nonempirical criterion. Any proponent of
the theory who believes that the criterion is important is then faced with
the following choice. Either he hopes that an interpretation meeting the
criterion will eventually be found and, whether or not he actually looks for
it, he grants that the search is an important task; or he concludes that the
theory, in spite of being empirically adequate, is not acceptable.
6 CONCLUSION
In attempting to solve the problems of measurement and instantaneous col-
lapse, the epistemic view asserts that state vectors do not represent states
of objects like electrons and photons, but rather the information we have on
the potential consequences of our experimental interventions into nature. I
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have argued that this picture is adequate in a world where the theoretical
structure used in the prediction of these consequences is independent of the
one used in the description of fundamental material constituents.
In the world we live in, however, whatever is responsible for clicks in
Geiger counters or cascades in photomultipliers also forms the basis of mate-
rial structure. The epistemic view can be construed as denying that micro-
objects exist or have states, or as being agnostic about any logically coherent
connection between them and macroscopic objects. In the first case, the so-
lution it proposes to the foundational problems is simply paradoxical, and
calls for an investigation of how it can be true. In the second case, it posits
the existence of a link between quantum and macroscopic objects. Once this
is realized, the urge to investigate the nature of this connection will not easily
subside.
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